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This paper investigates the impact of financial incentives on early retirement behaviour for 
high and low wage earners. Using a stylized life-cycle model, we derive hypotheses on the 
behaviour  of  the  two  types.  We  use  administrative  data  and  employ  two  identification 
strategies to test the predictions. First, we exploit exogenous variation in the replacement rate 
over  birth  cohorts  of  workers  who  are  eligible  to  a  transitional  early  retirement  scheme. 
Second, we employ a regression discontinuity design by comparing workers who are eligible 
and non-eligible to the transitional scheme. The empirical results show that low wage earners 
are, as predicted by the model, more sensitive to financial incentives. The results imply that 
low wage earners will experience a stronger incentive to continue working in an optimal early 
retirement scheme. 
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Abstract in Dutch 
Financiële prikkels voor doorgaan of stoppen met werken hebben een belangrijke rol 
gespeeld bij de ontwikkeling van de participatie van ouderen in de afgelopen decennia. In 
deze studie onderzoeken we het verschil in de mate waarmee werknemers met een hoog en 
laag inkomen reageren op financiële prikkels voor vervroegde uittreding. We gebruiken een 
levenscyclusmodel om hypothesen af te leiden voor het gedrag van deze werknemers. Op 
basis van administratieve gegevens toetsen we de hypothesen met twee verschillende 
empirische methoden. Ten eerste maken we gebruik van een daling van de uitkeringshoogte 
voor opeenvolgende geboortejaren van werknemers die recht hebben op een 
overgangsregeling. Ten tweede maken we gebruik van een discontinuïteit in de rechten van 
werknemers die net wel of net niet recht hebben op de overgangsregeling. De empirische 
resultaten laten zien dat werknemers met een laag inkomen sterker reageren op financiële 
prikkels, zoals is voorspeld door het theoretische model. De resultaten betekenen dat in een 
optimaal stelsel voor vervroegde uittreding werknemers met een laag inkomen een relatief 
sterke prikkel ondervinden om langer door te werken. 
 
Steekwoorden: pensioenen, vervroegde uittreding, arbeidsmarktgedrag 
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1.  Introduction 
Many countries are reforming their early retirement and pension schemes to guarantee the 
fiscal sustainability of the welfare system. In several countries, including Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands, the reforms have led to a public debate on the differential impact on high 
and low wage earners. In particular low wage earners may need to continue working at old 
age as they are in need of income, while high wage earners may have the resources to finance 
early retirement. This may be seen as unfair as low wage earners may have „hazardous or 
arduous‟ jobs, possibly reducing the time during which retirement benefit can be enjoyed 
(Zaidi  and  Whitehouse,  2009).  Optimal  early  retirement  and  pension  institutions  should 
include financial incentives to induce workers in good health to continue working (Cremer et 
al., 2004, 2008). For the assessment of the impact of such policy, it is useful to know how 
high and low wage earners react to such financial incentives. 
  Despite the extensive empirical literature, no study has investigated the difference in 
retirement behaviour of high and low wage earners.
3 The novelty of this paper is based on 
three elements. First,  we investigate both theoretically and empirically the early retirement 
choices and responses to financial incentives of high and low wage earners. Second, we use 
administrative data from the second large st pension fund in Netherlands ( the  health care 
pension fund PFZW, the  former PGGM). The data contain reliable information on  pension 
and early retirement rights of employees, and in particular we know the benefit level at each 
possible early retirement age. Third, we exploit two sources of exogenous variation in order 
to identify the effect of financial incentiv es. The first  source of  variation comes from a 
transitional  early retirement  scheme  that  includes a reduction in replaceme nt rates over 
successive birth cohorts.  The precise knowledge of the benefit level at each possible early 
retirement  age,  together  with  exogenous  variation  in  these  benefit  levels,  improves 
measurement and identification of financial incentives over a large part of the aforementioned 
literature. The second  source of  variation comes from a government reform on the fiscal 
treatment of early retirement. The reform affects individuals who are eligible and non-eligible 
to the transitional scheme in a different way. 
                                                 
3 The extensive literature includes Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) and Gruber and Wise (2004). The latter 
study, which employs a structural approach, includes studies on Germany (Börsch-Supan et al., 2004), the 
United Kingdom (Blundell et al., 2004), Italy (Brugiavini and Peracchi, 2004) and the Netherlands (De Vos and 
Kapteyn, 2004). Studies which exploit a „quasi-natural‟ experiment include Krueger and Pischke (1992), Baker 
and Benjamin (1999), Røed and Hangen (2003) and Euwals et al. (2010a).
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  The empirical results confirm the predictions of the stylized life-cycle model: low 
wage earners are more sensitive to financial incentives than high wage earners. A high cost of 
continuing  working  in  terms  of  utility,  possibly  because  of  hazardous  work  and  a  faster 
deterioration of health does not reduce the higher sensitivity to financial incentives of low 
wage  earners.  So  financial  incentives  for  continuing  working,  which  may  be  part  of  an 
optimal design of early retirement institutions, may induce in particular low wage workers to 
postpone early retirement. 
  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  a  model  to  illustrate  the 
differences  in  behaviour  between  high  and  low  wage  earners.  Section  3  discusses  early 
retirement in Netherlands and in particular in the health care sector. Section 4 presents the 
data. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategies, while section 6 discusses the results. 
 
2.  Stylized model on high and low wage earners 
This section employs a model to illustrate the potential impact of hazardous work on the 
reaction of high and low wage earners to financial incentives. The standard life cycle model 
shows that individuals retire at the moment the marginal utility of inactivity becomes equal to 
marginal  productivity.  Furthermore,  individuals  in  poor  health  will  retire  earlier  than 
individuals  in  good  health.  The  sensitivity  to  financial  incentives  is  however  not  clear 
upfront.  Low  wage  earners  may  be  more  sensitive  as  their  marginal  utility  to  income  is 
higher.  Low  wage  earners  may  also  be  less  sensitive  as  they  may  experience  a  stronger 
disutility of work, making working activity costly in terms of utility. 
 
2.1  The  model 
Consider two types of individuals who differ in the wage level, i.e.  L H w w , with subscript 
H for the high wage earner and L for the low wage earner. Each of them has an instantaneous 
utility function Ut at age t in which consumption ct and labour lt are separable: 
 
                   (1) 
 
where utility functions u and V fulfil the usual assumptions. The intensity of labour disutility 
rt increases with age. 
  Following Cremer et al. (2004, 2008), we implement several simplifying assumption. 
We design the model such that it illustrates the impact of the curvature of the felicity function   - 5 - 
 
 
u and the disutility of labour rt on early retirement behaviour. The assumptions will impact 
the  magnitude  of  the  effects,  but  will  leave  the  basic  idea  of  the  possible  difference  in 
magnitude  for  high  and  low  wage  earners  unaffected.  Some  of  the  assumptions  will  be 
discussed later on. We assume separability, concavity of the instantaneous utility functions, 
perfect  capital  markets  and  certain  lifetime  such  that  each  individual  sets  the  level  of 
consumption equal in all periods. As we will ignore the intensive margin of labour supply, we 
additionally assume lt=l to be time invariant and equal to one.
4 We assume individuals have 
no liquidity constraints.
5 The model reduces to a static model, and the choice is between the 
length of working life z and life cycle consumption c. Since consumption and labour are time 
invariant, lifetime utility can be written as: 
 
                    (2) 
 
with life span h and retirement age z, and where 
 
                      (3) 
 
The lifetime budget constraint is given by: 
 
                    (4) 
 
with wage rate w and T(w,z) is the difference between total tax payment and total retirement 
benefits. 
 
                (5) 
 
where τ(w) is the payroll tax and p(z) is the level of the pension benefit. The benefit may 
depend on the length of the working life z through a pension benefit formula. Considering 
that the pension system could be actuarially fair or unfair, we define p(z) as follows: 
                                                 
4 This assumption plays an important role in the optimal taxation literature (Cremer et al., 2004, 2008). In our 
case, it is not a restrictive assumption because the disutility of work depends on z and ʱ. The latter parameter 
will determine the differences in the disutility of work between high and low wage earners. 
5 This assumption guarantees consistency with the empirical model which is based on Stock and Wise (1990).    - 6 - 
 
 
                  (6) 
 
where ʴ represents the level of actuarial fairness. In case of an actuarial unfair system the 
pension benefit is independent of the earning history (ʴ=1), and in case of an actuarial fair 
system the net present value of the pension benefit is equal to the net present value of the 
taxes (ʴ=0). In practice, most pension systems in the world are a mixture of the two extreme 
systems. Substituting the term in T(w,z), the budget constraint can be rewritten as follows: 
 
                (7) 
 
The first order conditions with respect to c and z lead to the marginal rate of substitution 
between c and z: 
 
               (8) 
 
where the right-hand side of the equation represents the marginal net wage, whereby 
  represents  the  implicit  tax  on  retirement.  Individuals  continue 
working until the marginal disutility of working is not compensated anymore by the marginal 
utility of additional income generated by working. In general, the high wage earner has a 
higher MRS, meaning that she works and consumes more than the low wage earner. When the 
two types differ also in the disutility of work (i.e., ) the comparison between 
the two marginal rates of substitution is less clear. For   (when the pension system is at 
least partly actuarially unfair) there is a downward bias of the optimal retirement age for both 
types. This insight is confirmed by the research discussed in the introduction.  
  In order to derive the different sensitivity of the two types to financial incentives, we 
need to calculate the elasticities of retirement age (z) with respect to the wage rate (w) and the 
level of the pension benefit (p). These elasticities can be derived with implicit differentiation, 
but it is however not possible to determine which type of worker is more sensitive to the 
financial incentives coming from the wage level (price effect) and the pension benefit level 
(which is partly an income effect). In order to illustrate how the financial incentives affect the 
retirement age for the two types of workers, we provide a numerical example. 
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2.2  Numerical example 
The two types of workers differ in their wage level, that is  . They may also differ (or 
not) in their disutility of work. We illustrate also the case in which low wage earners have a 
higher disutility of work   as it is generally believed that these workers have 
physically more demanding jobs. 
  We consider the following functional forms for utility and disutility: 
 
                      (9) 
                            (10) 
 
We first consider the case in which high and low wage earners differ in the wage level only, 
i.e.,  . The other parameter values are chosen such that individuals work a 
major part of their adult life. The values are open for discussion and we return to the issue 
later. The simple model predicts that for the partly actuarial fair case, low wage earners work 
a larger part of their life than high wage earners (Table 1). The model also shows that an 
actuarial unfair system (ʴ=1) leads to early retirement. 
 
Table 1: Elasticities in case individuals differ in wage only 




  c  z  e_c(z) w.r.t. w  e(z) w.r.t. p 
         
Partly actuarial fair (δ=0.5)         
High wage earners  1.705  0.856  0.152  -0.024 
Low wage earners  0.861  0.873  0.163  -0.050 
Completely actuarial unfair (δ=1)         
High wage earners  1.665  0.832  0.216  -0.069 
Low wage earners  0.820  0.799  0.495  -0.301 
Note: wages   and parameter values γ=0.5 and ʱ=0.05 for both high and low wage earners. 
 
  The elasticities of z (i.e., retirement age) with respect to the wage rate and the pension 
benefit level are larger for low wage earners. The interpretation is obvious as low wage 
earners  are  on  the  steep  part  of  their  utility  function.  That  is,  a  marginal  increase  in 
consumption leads to a large increase in marginal utility. Furthermore, the elasticity with 
respect to the benefit level is particularly large in an actuarial unfair system. The prediction is   - 8 - 
 
 
in line with the low participation rates of elderly in countries with a high implicit tax rate, 
including the Netherlands (Gruber and Wise, 2004, De Vos and Kapteyn, 2004). 
  The question now is whether differences in disutility of work can turn the results 
upside down. We consider the case in which high and low wage earners differ both in their 
wage rate and their disutility of work. The low wage earners now work a smaller part of their 
life than high wage earners (Table 2). 
  The higher disutility of work for low wage earners does not make them less sensitive 
to financial incentives. Changes in financial conditions lead to sizable changes in behaviour. 
Moreover, the elasticity with respect to the benefit level in case of an actuarial unfair system 
becomes larger. This is again in line with the fact that in many European countries, of which 
most have an actuarial unfair system, in particular low wage earners retire early. 
 
Table 2: Elasticities in case individuals differ in wage and disutility of work 




  c  z  e_c(z) w.r.t. w  e(z) w.r.t. p 
         
Partly actuarial fair (δ=0.5)         
High wage earners  1.705  0.856  0.152  -0.024 
Low wage earners  0.788  0.769  0.290  -0.100 
Completely actuarial unfair (δ=1)         
High wage earners  1.665  0.832  0.216  -0.069 
Low wage earners  0.755  0.637  0.974  -0.661 
Note: wages   and parameter values γ=0.5 and  . 
 
  Clearly the choice of parameters values ʱ and γ affects the outcomes. The values have 
been chosen such that individuals work a major part of their adult live, a fact that is in line 
with labour market statistics. So other parameter values and other model specifications will of 
course  lead  to  different  results.  In  particular,  two  elements  may  play  a  role:  lifetime 
expectancy and time preference. In our model specification, lifetime (h) is certain and it is the 
same for high and low wage earners, while time preference is not included.
6 Our prediction of 
low wage earners being more sensitive to financial incentives holds however under many 
                                                 
6 Sensitivity analysis shows that life time (h) and time preference have an impact on the optimal choice of 
consumption (c) and retirement age (z), but the impact on the elasticities is limited.   - 9 - 
 
 
different specifications as low wage earners are on the steep part of their utility function. Still 
there may be model specifications and parameter values for which this is not the case and in 
the end it is an empirical question. The next sections will test the hypothesis. 
 
3.  Early retirement in the Dutch health sector  
Identification of the impact  of financial incentives  on  early  retirement behaviour will be 
based on changes in early retirement conditions of workers in the health care sector. This 
section describes the early retirement reforms in the Netherlands and the way they affected 
health care sector workers. The next section illustrates early retirement behaviour of high and 
low age earners in the sector. The figures in this section and the empirical analysis in the next 
sections are based on administrative data from the health care sector pension fund for the 
years 1999 – 2006. Such data contain reliable information on pension and early retirement 
rights of employees. Furthermore, the results will not necessarily be representative for all 
workers  in  the  Netherlands  as  women  with  caring  type  of  jobs  are  overrepresented  (see 
Appendix A for details on the data and descriptive statistics). 
 
3.1  Early retirement reforms in the Netherlands   
Until about one decade ago, the financial incentive for an individual to continue working at 
old age was low in the Netherlands. Most sectors had a generous early retirement scheme 
during the 1980s and the 1990s. Workers with a career which met conditions on tenure within 
the sector, qualified for an actuarial unfair early retirement benefit (the so-called VUT) at age 
60. The gross replacement rate of the benefit was about 80% of the last earned wage and 
continuing to work did not affect the replacement rate. So the implicit tax continuing to work 
was 80% to 100%. The actuarial unfair schemes were considered highly responsible for the 
low participation rate of elderly during the 1980s and the 1990s (De Vos and Kapteyn, 2004). 
  Policy improved the incentives to continue working at old age. First, the stakeholders, 
i.e., the unions and employer organizations, decided to reform the early retirement schemes 
starting from the end of 1990s onwards to guarantee the sustainability of the schemes. The 
new schemes would offer an actuarial fair early retirement benefit with a lower replacement 
rate. Actuarial fairness implies that postponement (advancement) of early retirement leads to 
an increase (decrease) in the benefit level, the net present value of the benefit is more or less   - 10 - 
 
 
independent of the age of retirement.
7 The starting date of the transition to the new schemes 
varied by sector. Civil servants were the first to be confronted with changing early retirement 
conditions as the reform of their scheme started on April 1, 1997. Health care sector workers 
were the second group as the reform of their scheme started on January 1, 1999. 
  To ease the pain of the reform, most sectors installed a transitional arrangement. The 
reform was harsh for workers close to eligibility for the old scheme as the replacement rates 
of  the  new  schemes  were  substantially  lower.  Workers  close  to  eligibility  and  who 
participated continuously in a pension fund of a  sector for a certain number of years  were 
offered access to a more generous transitional scheme.  
  A second policy that improved the incentives to continue working was installed on 
January 1, 2006. The Dutch government decided to stop the fiscally favourable treatment of 
actuarial unfair early retirement schemes from that date onwards. A higher participation rate 
of elderly was an explicit  policy goal and the government no longer wanted to subsidise 
schemes that discourage participation. The decision speeded  the transition process as it was 
already decided to transform the schemes towards actuarial fair schemes. The speeding up 
was substantial; many sectors of industry were going to have an actuarial fair system in 2015. 
 
3.2  The way the reforms affected workers in the health care sector 
From January 1, 1999 onwards, health care sector workers had no access anymore to the 
actuarial unfair scheme (the so-called VUT). Instead, workers had access to the new actuarial 
fair benefit with a lower replacement rate (the so-called FLEX).  
  Workers have a claim on the new benefit on the first day of the month in which they 
become 60 years old. The benefit level at age 60 is 1.75% of the basic salary for each year of 
participation to the pension fund. This is equal to the number of working years in the sector 
as participation is mandatory. The new scheme is less attractive even for workers who have 
been working in  the sector for 40  years  as  their replacement rate is  70%,  while the old 
scheme offered a replacement rate of 80%. In case of advancement or postponement of early 
retirement, the level of benefit is adjusted in an actuarially fair manner.  
  Workers close to age 60 had access to a transitional arrangement (the so-called OBU). 
The arrangement contains elements of the old and the new scheme. First, workers have access 
to the scheme in case they have been working uninterrupted in the sector for the last ten years 
                                                 
7 The actuarial adjustment is calculated on the basis of the time discount factor used by the pension fund; for the 
individual worker the adjustment may not be actuarial fair as the individual discount factor may be different.   - 11 - 
 
 
(a condition that held for the old scheme as well). Second, the scheme is actuarial unfair as 
continuing  working  does  not  result  in  a  higher  benefit  level.  Note  the  scheme  became 
actuarial fair in 2006 because of government policy. Third, the scheme has a transitional 
nature as the replacement rate was brought back over time from 80%, the rate of the old 
scheme,  to  70%,  the  rate  of  the  new  scheme.  Workers  born  in  1939  or  before  got  a 
replacement rate of 80%, workers born in 1940 got 79%, and further down workers born in 
1948 got 71%. Workers born in 1949 and later had no access to the transitional arrangement. 
 
Figure 1: hazard rate for early retirement, high (left) and low (right) wage earners  
 
Source: administrative data of the pension fund of the health care sector, 1999-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Probability of early retirement conditional on being employed at year t-1, Kaplan-Maier estimator for 
workers eligible to the transitional scheme. High and low wage earners are defined on the basis of a fixed effects 
model, see Appendix B for details. 
 
3.3  Early retirement behaviour in the health care sector 
Descriptive  statistics  do  not  reveal  a  substantial  difference  in  early  retirement  behaviour 
between high and low wage earners. The hazard rate into early retirement is rather similar for 
both  types  of  workers  (Figure  1).  Many  workers  have  access  to  the  transitional  early 
retirement scheme at age 60 and most of them take that opportunity.
8 This result is in line 
with previous research on the impact of the old early retirement scheme  (Kerkhofs et al., 
1999, De Vos and Kapteyn, 2004, Heyma, 2004). 
  The scheme of the health care sector offers the opportunity of part-time retirement at 
age 58 or 59, but this opportunity does not seem popular. Workers who have access to an 
early retirement benefit at age 60 can retire at age 58 (59) and receive 50% of the benefit 
                                                 
8 We consider workers who have access to the transitional arrangement only; workers without access may have 
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during ages 58 to 61 (59 and 60). From age 62 (61) onwards they receive the full 100% of the 
benefit. The take up of part-time early retirement does not seem to differ between high and 
low wage earners, as well. 
  The decrease in the replacement rate of the transitional arrangement may have led to a 
decreasing conditional probability (hazard rate) to retire, but this trend does not seem to be 
present in Figure 1. The conditional probability to retire early actually seems to increase over 
time for both high and low wage earners. The reason may however be that the fraction of 
workers that is eligible to the transitional scheme at age 60 also increases over time. The 
empirical analysis of the next section will take the exact timing of the early retirement rights 
into account, and it will use the exact timing to identify the impact of the financial incentives. 
 
Figure 2: Hazard rate for disability (left) or other exit route (right) 
 
Source: administrative data of the pension fund of the health care sector, 1999-2006, own calculations. 
Note: probability for disability and other exit route conditional on being employed at year t-1 for high and low 
wage earners born in 1948 (last birth year eligible to transitional scheme) and 1949 (not eligible). High and low 
wage earners are defined on the basis of a fixed effects model, see Appendix B for details. 
 
3.4  Alternative exit routes and the 2006 policy reform 
Alternative exit routes may be relatively attractive for generations born in 1949 and later as 
they are not eligible to the (rather generous) transitional early retirement scheme. The 2006 
policy  reform  makes  early  retirement  however  more  attractive  again,  as  from  that  date 
onwards it pays to postpone early retirement. As the reform was certain to be implemented in 
2005, this may have induced workers born in 1949 and later to continue working in 2005. We 
compare workers who are born in 1948 (i.e. so who are eligible to the transitional scheme) 
and individuals who are born in 1949 (i.e. who are non-eligible), both having at least ten 
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  As workers born in 1948 and 1949 could not yet retire early during our period of 
observation, which is 1999 – 2006, the question is whether the 2006 policy reform changed 
their labour market exit behaviour through disability or other exit routes (i.e. unemployment 
and inactivity). The conditional probability of leaving the labour market through disability or 
other exit routes is small for both birth years (Figure 2). For both high and low wage earners, 
the two cohorts have similar trend for the inflow in disability as well as for the use of other 
exit routes. 
 
4.  Empirical strategy 
We employ two identification strategies to estimate the impact of financial incentives on 
early retirement behaviour. First, we exploit exogenous variation in the replacement rates 
over birth cohorts of workers who are eligible to the transitional scheme. Second, we employ 
a regression discontinuity design by comparing individuals who are eligible and non-eligible 
to the transitional scheme. 
 
4.1  Workers eligible to the transitional scheme 
To exploit the variation in the replacement rates over birth cohorts, we use the empirical 
model of Stock and Wise (1990). We select working individuals between age 57 and 63 years 
old and who are eligible to the transitional scheme. We distinguish between high and low 
wage earners on the basis of a fixed effect wage regression.
9 The variable of interest is the 
probability to retire in year  t+1 given that the individual works in year t. Using a Linear 




where   is composed by a set of demographics, age dummies, employment characteristics 
and the unemployment rate.
10 The variable   represents Social Security Wealth,   
represents the financial incentive for the price (wage) effect and   represents the Option 
Value to Wait. Note that because of the administrative data we know exactly the benefit level 
                                                 
9 The classification is made on the basis of the fixed effect, which is estimated conditional on demographics and 
employment characteristics (but not educational attainment). See Appendix B for details. 
10 The demographics include gender, marital status, nationality and number of children, while the employment 
characteristics include the number of jobs and tenure in the sector.   - 14 - 
 
 
at each possible retirement age. This improves the measurement and identification of the 
financial incentives over a large part of the literature discussed in the introduction. We use 
two different measures for the financial incentive, the implicit tax on continuing to work and 
the peak value (Stock and Wise, 1990). Social Security Wealth is the Net Present Value of 
the early retirement and pension benefits   the individual would receive retiring at 
age t: 
 
               (12) 
 
where R is the retirement age, ʴ is the discount factor and γt is the survival probability.
11 Each 
individual is eligible to the new actuarial fair scheme (FLEX) at any age above age 55, and 
becomes eligible to the transitional scheme (OBU) at age  . Therefore   is equal to: 
 
               (13) 
 
The implicit tax of postponing retirement from year t to year t+1 is given by: 
 
                         (14) 
 
where   is the wage at year t+1.
12 The peak value is the maximum difference in social 
security wealth when retiring at future ages and retiring at current age: 
 
                 (15) 
 
where M is the year in which the individual reaches mandatory retirement age of 65. Finally, 
the option value to wait gives the gain of postponing retirement: 
 
                  (16) 
                                                 
11 The time discount rate of 3% and the survival table are provided by the pension fund of the health care sector. 
12 The wage at t+1 in the implicit tax formula is given by pensionable salary in t+1 used by the pension fund to 
calculate the pension benefit level.   - 15 - 
 
 
where   is the net present value of social security wealth for individual i at year t and 
reaching eligibility for the (generous) transitional OBU scheme in year s.  
  Using the empirical model of equation (11), we test whether low wage earners react 
stronger  to  financial  incentives  represented  by  the  social  security  wealth  (the  income  or 
pension effect), the financial measure for the return to continuing working (the price or wage 
effect),  and  the  option  value  to  wait.  So  we  expect  to  find  larger  parameter  estimates, 
representing the size of the reaction to financial incentives, for low wage earners.  
  Note that the computation of the net present value of the early retirement and pension 
benefits,  which  underlies  the  financial  incentives,  does  not  take  potential  differences  in 
lifetime expectancy and time preference into account. Empirical evidence suggests that low 
wage earners have a lower life expectancy and higher time discount rate.
13 The potential 
overestimation of the net present value for low wage  earners leads to an underestimation of 
the parameters for this group. We nevertheless decide to test our hypotheses on the basis of 
the assumptions as we have no information on the true life expectancy and time discount rate 
and the results give a lower bound for the true difference between high and low wage earners.  
 
4.2  Workers eligible and non-eligible to the transitional scheme 
Workers born in 1948 and 1949 should be rather similar in many respects, but they differ 
substantially in their early retirement pension rights. Workers born in 1948 may be eligible to 
the transitional scheme, while workers born in 1949 are not eligible. We exploit a treatment-
control design to estimate the impact to have access, whereby the so-called „treatment‟ group 
includes individuals born in 1948 and the „control‟ group includes individuals born in 1949. 
We select individuals with tenure of at least 10 years to guarantee that individuals meet the 
eligibility condition of the transitional scheme in both groups. 
  The  variable  of  interest  is  the  conditional  probability  of  working,  entering  the 
disability scheme or using another exit route in year t+1 given the status of working in year t. 
The  use  of  a  Regression  Discontinuity  Design  (RDD)  approach  assures  that  the  average 
outcome for individual marginally above the 1948 birth year threshold represents a valid 
counterfactual for the outcomes for individuals just below the threshold. Using a multinomial 
logit model we estimate the following equation: 
 
             (17) 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Kalwij et al. (2009).   - 16 - 
 
 
with birth year bi. We also investigate the existence of an anticipation effect of the reform 
using the following equation:  
 
                                    (18) 
 
The interaction variable measures the anticipation effect of the reform in 2006 on the labour 
market outcomes. As from 2006 onwards postponement of early retirement becomes more 
attractive, one may expect to see an increased propensity to continue working in 2005. 
 
5.  Empirical results 
On the basis of the theoretical model described in section 2, we expect low wage earners to 
be  more  sensitive  to  financial  incentives  than  high  wage  workers.  We  use  the  empirical 
models of the previous section to test the hypothesis. 
 
5.1  Workers eligible to the transitional scheme 
The first identification strategy exploits the change in the replacement rate of the transitional 
scheme over birth cohorts. The results confirm the theoretical prediction as low wage earners 
are indeed more sensitive to financial incentives (Table 3). 
  The effect of Social Security Wealth (SSW) can be considered as a measure of the 
income effect. The empirical literature reports a small but significant effect. We find that for 
high wage earners the impact of SSW is small and not always significant. For low wage 
earners, we find a more substantial and significant effect. An increase in SSW with 22,000 
euro (the median wage for low wage earners) leads to increase of the conditional probability 
to retire of 1%-or 0.4%-point for the model with the implicit tax or the peak value. This 
implies a decrease of early retirement age of one month or half a month. The income effect is 
small, a result that is in line with the empirical literature discussed in the introduction.    
  The variables Option Value to Wait (OVW), Implicit Tax (IT) and Peak Value (PV) 
could be considered as measures of the price effect. The empirical literature discussed in the 
introduction reports a substantial and statistically significant effect on the decision to retire. 
The  OVW  has  a  negative  and  highly  significant  effect  on  retirement.  The  effect  is 
substantially  larger  for  low  wage  earners.  In  other  words,  a  high  reward  on  waiting  for 
retirement lowers the probability to retire the next year in particular for low wage earners. 
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Table 3: Conditional probability of early retirement, marginal effects 
(a) 
  High  wage 
earners 
  Low  wage 
earners 
  High  wage 
earners 
  Low  wage 
earners 
 
Option Value of Waiting 
(b)  -0.018  ***  -0.208  ***  -0.011  **  -0.123  *** 
  (-0.004)    (0.011)    (-0.005)    (0.012)   
Social Security Wealth 
(c)  -0.001    0.047  ***  -0.002    0.017  *** 
  (0.001)    (0.003)    (0.001)    (0.004)   
Implicit tax  0.030  ***  0.050  ***         
  (0.003)    (0.003)           
Peak Value 
(d)          -0.045  ***  -0.814  *** 
          (0.010)    (0.033)   
Demographics  yes  ***  yes  ***  yes  ***  yes  *** 
Employment characteristics  yes    yes  ***  yes    yes  *** 
Unemployment rate  -0.013  ***  -0.004  ***  -0.013  ***  -0.005  *** 
  (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
# observations  79,655    80,991    79,655    80,991   
Source: administrative data of the pension fund of the health care sector, 1999-2006. 
(a) Probability to retirement conditional on employment at year t-1, linear random effects model, standard errors 
between parenthesis, parameter values with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at a level of 10%, 5% and 
1%. High and low wage earners are defined on the basis of a fixed effects model (Appendix B). The financial 
variables on option value, social security wealth and peak value are measured in 100,000 euros. Demographics 
include age dummies, gender, marital status, children and migration background. Employment characteristics 
include number of jobs and tenure. Complete estimation results are reported in Appendix C. 
(b) Option value of becoming eligible to the transitional early retirement scheme (equation 16). 
(c) Social security wealth, the net present value of the early retirement and pension benefit (equation 13). 
(d) Peak value, social security wealth maximised by choosing the optimal early retirement age (equation 15). 
  
  The implicit tax IT has a positive and highly significant effect: a high implicit tax on 
continuing to work leads to a high probability of retiring the next year. A change from a 
actuarial fair system (i.e. an implicit tax of zero) to a actuarial unfair system (i.e. an implicit 
tax of one) implies an increase in the conditional probability of 3%-points for high and 5%-
points for low wage earners. The PV has a strongly negative and highly significant effect. For 
low wage earners, a decrease of the option value of 22,000 euro (which roughly is similar to a 
change in the implicit tax from zero to one) implies an increase in the conditional probability 
of retirement of 18%-points. This implies a decrease in the early retirement age of about one 
year. The size of the price or wage effect may seem large, but it is in line with the literature 
discussed in the introduction. Moreover, note the reforms in the Netherlands imply a change 
from a completely actuarial unfair to a completely actuarial fair system and the participation 
rates of the age groups 55-64 have indeed increased strongly (Euwals et al., 2009).   - 18 - 
 
 
  The differences in the impact of the financial variables (i.e., SSW, OVW, IT and PV) 
on  high  and  low  wage  earners  are  statistically  significant.  As  mentioned  before,  these 
variables are computed assuming the same survival probability and the same discount rate for 
both high and low wage earners. Given the definition of these variables, different survival 
probability and discount rate for the two groups would have a “re-scaling” effect on SSW 
(and consequently on the other variables) widening the differences between high and low 
wage earners. Therefore, our results can be considered as a lower bound for the difference 
between high and low wage earners. 
  Considering  the  other  variables  it  turns  out  that  individuals  having  children  and 
individuals who have more than one job are less likely to retire next year (see Appendix C for 
the estimation results). Furthermore women, married and natives are more likely to retire 
earlier. The modal retirement age, independent of the financial incentives, turns out to be 60 
years.  The  fact  that  financial  variables  do  not  fully  explain  a  peak  in  the  retirement 
probability at a certain  age is a common finding in the literature and hints at the fact that 
other aspects, for example social norms in behaviour, play a role as well.  
 
5.2  Workers eligible and non-eligible to the transitional scheme 
The second identification strategy compares individuals who are born in the year 1948 (i.e., 
who are eligible to the generous transitional scheme) to individuals who are born in the year 
1949 (i.e., who are not eligible). We consider two labour market outcomes: the probability of 
inflow in the disability scheme and the probability of entering an alternative exit route (i.e. 
unemployment or inactivity). Note that not exiting through disability or another exit route 
implies continuing to work as the workers are too young to be eligible for early retirement. 
One may expect the 1948 birth cohort to be less likely to enter the disability scheme as they 
will have access to the transitional early retirement scheme within a few years.  
  The results do hint at a significant difference in labour market behaviour between the 
two birth cohorts (Table 4). This holds for both high and low wage earners. Note that for both 
groups the size of the effect is rather small in economic terms. The 1948 birth cohort has only 
a 0.2%-point smaller probability to enter disability than the 1949 birth cohort. As the 
difference between the cohorts is small, the difference between high and low wage earners is 
small as well. Furthermore, the results do not hint at an anticipation effect of the 2006 reform 
for both high and low wage earners. 
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Table 4: Conditional probability of disability or other exit route, marginal effects 
(a) 
  High wage earners      Low wage earners     
  RRD    Anticipation 
2006 reform 
RRD    Anticipation 
2006 reform 
Disability                 
Cohort48  -0.002  ***  -0.002  ***  -0.002  ***  -0.002  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Year05      0.001        0.001   
      (0.002)        (0.002)   
Cohort48 * Year05      0.000        0.000   
      (0.002)        (0.000)   
Demographics  yes  ***  yes  ***  yes  ***  yes  *** 
Empl. char.  yes    yes  ***  yes  ***  yes  *** 
Unempl. rate  -0.007  ***  -0.007  ***  -0.008  ***  -0.008  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Other exit routes                 
Cohort48  0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.001)   
Year05      0.000        0.006   
      (0.000)        (0.002)   
Cohort48 * Year05      0.000        0.000   
      (0.000)        (0.000)   
Demographics  yes  ***  yes  ***  yes  ***  yes  *** 
Empl. char.  yes  ***  yes  ***  yes  ***  yes  *** 
Unempl. rate  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  -0.008  ***  -0.007  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
# observations  9701    9701    8897    8897   
Source: administrative data of the pension fund of the health care sector, 1999-2006. 
(a) Probability of disability or other exit route conditional on employment at year t-1 for the birth cohorts 1948 
and 1949, linear random effects model, standard errors between parenthesis, parameter values with *, ** and 
*** are statistically significant at a level of 10%, 5% and 1%. High and low wage earners are defined on the 
basis  of  a  fixed  effects  model  (Appendix  B).  Demographics  include  age  dummies,  gender,  marital  status, 
children and migration background. Employment characteristics include number of jobs and tenure. Complete 
estimation results are reported in Appendix C. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of financial incentives on early retirement behaviour of 
high  and  low  wage  earners.  Using  a  stylized  life-cycle  model  we  derive  empirical   - 20 - 
 
 
implications on the behaviour of the two types. The model predicts that low wage earners are 
more sensitive to financial incentives than high wage earners. 
  We use administrative pension fund data from the Dutch health sector to test the 
hypothesis.  In  order  to  identify  the  effect  of  financial  incentives  on  early  retirement  we 
employ  two  identification  strategies.  First,  we  look  at  the  early  retirement  choices  of 
individuals who are eligible to a transitional early retirement scheme. The empirical analysis 
exploits a gradual change in the replacement rate over successive birth cohorts. We use direct 
measures of financial incentives like social security wealth, option value to wait to become 
eligible, implicit tax and peak value.  The precise knowledge of the benefit level at  each 
possible retirement age, which is available because of the administrative data, together with 
the exogenous variation in these benefit levels improve measurement and identification of the 
impact of financial incentives on early retirement behaviour over a large part of the literature. 
Second, we look at the labour market behaviour of two successive birth years, 1948 and 
1949. We exploit a regression discontinuity approach as the first birth cohort is the last one to 
be eligible to the transitional early retirement scheme, while the second cohort is not eligible. 
We  study  differences  inflow  in  disability  and  alternative  labour  market  exits  routes.  We 
additionally test for an anticipation effect of the 2006 policy reform. 
  The  empirical  results  show  that  low  wage  earners  are  more  sensitive  to  financial 
incentives than high wage earners. The difference in behaviour is substantial for almost all 
measures for the financial incentives. Both the income effect (measured by social security 
wealth) and the price effect (measured by the peak value and the option value to wait) are 
more important for low wage earners. We do find evidence for a difference in behaviour 
between the 1948 and 1949 birth cohort, but the difference in size is small. The difference 
between high and low wage earners is small as well and we find no statistically significant 
anticipation effect for the 2006 policy reform. 
  An optimal early retirement scheme may include an early retirement option from a 
certain  age  onwards  with  an  actuarial  unfair  adjustment  of  the  benefit  level  in  case  the 
individual decides to continue working (Cremer et al., 2004, 2008). The early retirement 
option serves as an insurance against unobservable health shock. In such a scheme healthy 
workers experience a financial incentive to continue working, even though there may be an 
implicit tax on continuing. Our results imply that such a scheme will induce low wage earners 
to continue working. In the public debate this may not be expected as the outcome from an 
optimal scheme, in  particular as  special pensions  for workers  with  „hazardous‟ work  are 
common practice in many countries (Zaidi and Whitehouse, 2009).   - 21 - 
 
 
  Many questions are still open for future research, in particular on the exact impact of 
financial incentives. The models used in this study do not allow for liquidity constraints and 
short-sighted or irrational behaviour. From theory we know that liquidity constraints may 
affect high and low wage earners in a different way. High wage earners may experience such 
constraints early in life as they start working late and they have steep wage profiles. Low 
wage earners may experience liquidity constraints later in life as they may want to borrow 
against their social security rights. The latter liquidity constraints may however result from 
short-sighted or irrational behaviour, which may occur among low wage earners more often. 
On  the  empirical  side  there  exist  intriguing  challenges  as  well.  The  Dutch  2006  policy 
reform, for example, will offer great opportunities to identify the causal impact of financial 
incentives on retirement behaviour in the upcoming years. 
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Appendix A: Data 
The empirical analysis in this study is based on administrative data from the second largest 
pension fund in the Netherlands, the health care sector pension fund PFZW (former PGGM). 
The fund placed the administrative records of its participants for the years 1999 – 2007 at the 
disposal of Statistic Netherlands. The data is processed such that it can be merged to other 
administrative data available at Statistic Netherlands. 
  The administrative pension fund data is a yearly cross-section containing individual 
records of the participants of the fund. The data contains information on gender, date of birth, 
working hours, wages, tenure and pension and early retirement rights. The kind of occupation 
is not available in the data, but nevertheless we know that the occupations vary from nurses 
to medical doctors and include supporting activities like administration. Note that not all 
medical  doctors  are  included  in  the  data  as  many  are  self-employed.  The  number  of 
observations in the dataset increases from 0.8 million in 1999 to 1.2 million in 2006. The 
number of observations in the data increases over time for two reasons. The Dutch health 
sector is growing due to population growth and ageing, which leads to an increase in the 
demand for health care. Furthermore, the fund is expanding due to the acquisition of firms 
that belong to the sector but that where not yet participating in the fund. 
  We merge the administrative pension fund data to two other datasets. The first is the 
administrative municipality dataset (GBA), which is based on population registers. It contains 
demographic information like birth, marriage, local migration and mortality. The second is 
the administrative employment register dataset (SSB_jobs), which is based on the national 
employment insurance registers and on the tax registers. The registers contain information on 
working hours, salary and some firm information (see Euwals et al., 2010b, for details)
  
  The health sector employs many part-time working women (Table 5). This is due to 
large number of nursing jobs within the sector. Furthermore, many individuals are between 
age 25 and 50. Only few individuals have tenure in the sector of more than 30 years, which is 
largely the result of a relatively young workforce. A minority of employees works fulltime, 
whereby the fraction has increased from about one out of four in 1999 to about one out of 
three in 2006. The gross fulltime wage ranges from 20 to 42 thousand euro per year in 2006. 
Wage inequality has increased over time. The gross fulltime wage of the upper quintile (q90) 
has increased with 32% while for the lowest quintile (q10) it has increased with 26%. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics, age 15-64, 1999-2006 
(a) 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2005  2006 
  thousands             
Observations  787  881  808  1.158  1.032  1018  1109 
               
Gender  %             
Female  82  82  83  82  83  84  84 
Male  18  18  17  18  17  16  16 
               
Age               
<20  1  1  2  2  2  2  1 
20-24  6  7  8  8  9  9  8 
25-29  12  10  10  10  10  11  10 
30-34  14  14  13  13  11  11  10 
35-39  16  16  15  14  13  13  12 
40-44  17  17  16  16  15  15  14 
45-49  15  19  15  15  15  15  15 
50-54  12  12  12  12  12  13  13 
55-49  6  7  7  8  9  9  10 
60-65  2  2  3  3  3  2  6 
               
Working hours               
1-11 hours  14  15  16  34  21  9  9 
12-23 hours  31  30  29  23  27  27  28 
24-31 hours  20  20  20  16  19  20  21 
32-35 hours  11  11  12  9  12  12  12 
36 and more hours  24  24  23  18  21  31  31 
               
Tenure               
0-9 years  61  59  60  56  55  57  52 
10-19 years  26  27  29  28  28  27  28 
20-29 years  12  12  14  13  14  13  15 
30-39 years  1  2  2  2  3  3  5 
>40 years  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
               
Fulltime salary 
(b)  thousands             
Q10  15.4  15.7  16.4  16.9  18.0  18.9  19.4 
Q25  17.9  18.4  19.2  19.8  21.2  22.3  22.8 
Q50  22.0  22.6  23.8  24.5  26.6  27.9  28.4 
Q75  26.6  27.5  28.9  30.2  32.5  33.9  34.3 
Q90  31.7  32.9  34.6  36.4  38.9  40.9  41.7 
Source: administrative data of the pension fund of the health care sector, 1999-2006. 
(a) Participants of the pension fund PFZW, the pension fund of the health care sector. The participants include 
former participants (so-called „sleepers‟) and exclude PFZW and PGGM employees. The participants include, 
for example, nurses, social workers, and physicians employed by a hospital. The years 2004 and 2007 are not 
used as the data are incomplete for these particular years. 
(b) The so-called „pensionable‟ salary in gross terms.   - 26 - 
 
 
  During the first year of observation, the year 1999, about 95% of workers born before 
1949 is eligible to the transitional scheme. Most of them have access at age 60; only a small 
percentage of workers have access at age 61 or later (see also Euwals, Trevisan and van 
Vuren, 2010). The later access is partly the result of the requirement to be working in the 
sector for at least 10 years. Selection may also play a role however. Workers eligible at age 
60 may have decided to continue working and are therefore eligible at age 61. The number of 
employees who do not satisfy the requirements for the transitional arrangement is higher in 
2006. This may again be a selection effect as to be eligible one needed to be employed in the 
sector in 1998. 
  Individuals who are and are not eligible to the transitional scheme differ in several 
aspects. The major difference is represented by tenure distribution; the majority of the „non-
eligible‟ has tenure lower than ten years. This is a result of the conditions to be eligible. The 
two groups differ in other aspects as well. Many of the non-eligible individuals are women, 
work part-time for one to eleven hours per week, and have lower wages.  
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Appendix B: Definition of high and low wage earners 
The study identifies the difference in the impact of financial incentives on early retirement 
behaviour  between  high  and  low  wage  earners.  Another  obvious  choice  to  distinguish 
between groups would have been educational attainment, but unfortunately it is not observed 
in the administrative data.  
  To  distinguish  between  high  and  low  skilled  workers  we  use  the  variable  on  the 
fulltime wage. In order to maintain the same composition of the two groups over all periods 
we run a fixed effect model on the fulltime wage using demographic variables and time 
dummies. We use the following equation: 
 
                        (19) 
 
where   is the fulltime wage,   is the individual fixed effect and   is the time effect. The 
vector   contain exogenous variables including number of children, marital status, number 
of jobs, tenure and unemployment rate. Next, we look at the distribution of the individual 
fixed effect and we define high skilled workers as individuals who have fixed effect higher 
than the median and low skilled workers as individuals who have a fixed effect lower than the 
median. 
  The estimation results may be sensitive to the choice of the cut-off point to distinguish 
between  the  high  and  low  wage  earners.  For  this  reason  we  performed  some  sensitivity 
analyses, using the (25
th, 75
th) percentile and the (10
th, 90
th) percentile as cut-off points. The 
conclusions from these analyses are in line with the results presented in the study. 
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Appendix C: Estimation results 
 
Table 6: Conditional probability of early retirement, marginal effects 
(a) 
High wage earners  Low wage earners  High wage earners  Low wage earners 
OVW   -0.018  ***  -0.208  ***  -0.011  **  -0.123  *** 
  (0.004)    (0.011)    (0.005)    (0.012)   
SSW  -0.001    0.047  ***  -0.002  ***  0.017  *** 
  (0.001)    (0.003)    (0.001)    (0.004)   
Implicit tax  0.030  ***  0.050  ***         
  (0.003)    (0.003)           
Peak Value          -0.045  ***  -0.814  *** 
          (0.010)    (0.033)   
Female  0.012  ***  0.052  ***  0.011  ***  0.035  *** 
  (0.003)    (0.005)    (0.003)    (0.005)   
Dutch  0.014  ***  0.004    0.014  ***  0.005   
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.003)    (0.004)   
Children  -0.009  ***  -0.014  ***  -0.010  **  -0.014  *** 
  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)   
Married  0.007  **  0.019  ***  0.007  **  0.018  *** 
  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)   
Number of jobs  0.001    -0.015  ***  0.001    -0.015  *** 
  (0.004)    (0.003)    (0.004)    (0.003)   
Tenure  0.000    -0.002  ***  0.000    -0.001  *** 
  (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Age 57  -0.335  ***  -0.332  ***  -0.351  ***  -0.355  *** 
  (0.006)    (0.004)    (0.006)    (0.004)   
Age 58  -0.359  ***  -0.342  ***  -0.373  ***  -0.348  *** 
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)   
Age 60  -0.243  ***  -0.246  ***  -0.249  ***  -0.240  *** 
  (0.010)    (0.007)    (0.010)    (0.007)   
Age 61  -0.262  ***  -0.245  ***  -0.268  ***  -0.243  *** 
  (0.013)    (0.008)    (0.013)    (0.008)   
Age 62  -0.327  ***  -0.308  ***  -0.331  ***  -0.309  *** 
  (0.018)    (0.010)    (0.018)    (0.010)   
Unempl. rate  -0.013  ***  -0.004  ***  -0.013  ***  -0.005  *** 
  (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
(a) Probability to retirement conditional on employment at year t-1, linear random effects model, standard errors 
between parenthesis, parameter values with *, ** and *** are significant at a level of 10%, 5% and 1%.    - 29 - 
 
 
Table 7: Conditional probability of disability or other exit route, marginal effects 
(a) 
  High wage earners      Low wage earners     
  RRD    Anticipation 
2006 reform 
  RRD    Anticipation 
2006 reform 
 
Disability                 
Cohort48  -0.002  ***  -0.002  ***  -0.002  ***  -0.002  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Year05      0.001        0.001   
      (0.002)        (0.002)   
Cohort48 * Year05      0.000        0.000   
      (0.002)        (0.000)   
Age  0.002  ***  0.002  ***  0.002  ***  0.002  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Female  0.004  ***  0.003  ***  0.002  *  0.001  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.000)   
Dutch  -0.002  ***  0.000    -0.001  *  -0.000   
  (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Children  -0.001  ***  -0.001  ***  -0.001  ***  -0.001  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Married  -0.002  ***  -0.001  ***  -0.001  ***  -0.001  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Number of jobs  0.000    -0.003  ***  -0.004  ***  -0.003  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.000)   
Tenure  0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000  *** 
  (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Unempl. rate  -0.007  ***  -0.007  ***  -0.008  ***  -0.008  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
(a) Probability of disability or other exit route conditional on employment at year t-1, linear random effects 
model, standard errors between parenthesis, parameter values with *, ** and *** are statistically significant at a 
level of 10%, 5% and 1%. High and low wage earners are defined on the basis of a fixed effects model. 
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Table 7 continued: Conditional probability of disability or other exit route 
  High wage earners      Low wage earners     
  RRD    Anticipation 
2006 reform 
  RRD    Anticipation 
2006 reform 
 
Other exit routes                 
Cohort48  0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.001)   
Year05      0.000        0.006   
      (0.000)        (0.002)   
Cohort48 * Year05      0.000        0.000   
      (0.000)        (0.000)   
Age  0.000    0.000    0.003  ***  0.002  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Female  0.001  ***  0.002  ***  0.000    0.000   
  (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Dutch  0.000    0.001  *  0.001  *  0.001  ** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Children  0.000    0.000    0.001  *  0.001  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Married   0.000    0.001    -0.001  ***  -0.002  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Number of jobs  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  -0.004  ***  -0.004  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Tenure  0.000    0.000    0.000  ***  0.000   
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Unempl.rate  0.001  ***  0.001  ***  -0.008  ***  -0.007  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
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